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The relationship between 1. recipes, 2. ingredients and 3. dishes may be 
understood in analogy to the relationship between elements in the performing 
arts: for example, in music, 1. musical works (and / or scores), 2. ‘musical 
ingredients’ (notes, scales, intervals, arpeggios, pauses etc.) and 3. 
performances. The recipe’s inventor is a ‘composer’ and the cook is a 
‘performer’. As I will argue, both in musical performances and in the preparation 
of dishes, the application of norms requires ‘creative’ adaptation to the concrete 
specific situation and the final product emerges from practical interactions that 
involve transformations of their own normative bases. Hence, both in culinary 
practices and performing arts like music, the improvisational case is paramount 
for understanding how their normativity, as paradigmatic of the normativity of 
human practices in general, works. 
1. A sound and tasty analogy 
It sounds plausible to argue that the relation between recipes and dishes is 
interestingly similar to that of musical works and their performances. Indeed this 
analogy, sometimes linked to the discussion of food as an art, is recognized as 
heuristically important by many scholars.1 Just as a musical composition can be 
understood, at a first glance, as a set of instructions (often notated in a score) for 
the realization of a performance, a recipe can be understood as a set of 
instructions for producing a dish. Accordingly, the cook is the ‘performer’ of the 
recipe. 
 
† University of Turin, Italy. 
1 For discussions on food as art, see Korsmeyer 1999; Kuehn 2005; Perullo 2013; 2014; 2016; 
specifically on the analogy between recipes and musical works, see Monroe 2007; Marrone 2014; 
Borghini 2015; Sweeney 2018. 
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A musical work gives performers the rules they must follow to perform it 
properly, i.e. respecting the instructions provided by its composer in 
accordance with the artistic standards of the relevant cultural context. On the 
one hand, performers can comply more or less exactly with those rules. On the 
other hand, performers maintain a margin in which they may express their 
creativity in offering the work to the audience. So a musical performance can be 
more or less correct (and ‘authentic’ as compliant with the score), but may also 
be more or less aesthetically successful by virtue of the performers’ expressive 
contribution (and ‘authentic’ as expressing performer’s creativity).2 
Similarly, a recipe presents cooks with the instructions they must follow in 
order to prepare a dish. These instructions are established by the author of the 
recipe, based on a tradition of culinary practices. On the one hand, the 
instructions provided by the recipe can be followed in a more or less correct way; 
on the other hand, while following the recipe instructions correctly, a cook can 
prepare the dish more or less creatively, contributing to it with her own personal 
touch. 
Schematically, the relationship between 1. (usually written) recipes, 2. 
ingredients, and 3. dishes may thus be understood in analogy to the relationship 
between elements in the performing arts: for example, in music, 1. (usually 
scored) musical compositions, 2. ‘musical ingredients’ (such as notes, scales, 
intervals, arpeggios, pauses etc.) and 3. performances.  
Following this line of thought, we can deepen the comparison between 
musical works and recipes further. A recipe is an artifact that bears a label 
through which is identified. It depends constitutively, but not entirely, by human 
fiat: it «cannot exist unless someone declares its existence» (Borghini 2015, p. 
727). Moreover, in order to be effective, the declaration of existence must be 
carried out by a qualified agent, who acquires this qualification «through a 
process of apprenticeship» (Borghini 2015, p. 727), and must be accepted as 
valid by a community of restaurant goers, eaters, culinary experts, etc. The same 
goes for the realization of a dish following a recipe: the cook must declare her 
intention to realize a certain dish and must be qualified for doing this. It goes 
without saying that the appropriate qualification can be acquired precisely 
through the performance (the elaboration of a recipe or a dish), provided that 
this is recognized as valid by the gastronomic community. 
 
2 See Kivy 1995. For recent accounts of the issue of musical authenticity see Bertinetto 2019a 
and Kania 2020, pp. 178-203. 
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This happens in the musical realm as well. A musical work is an artifact that 
bears a title (a label) affixed by a qualified agent: this agent is usually (but not 
always)3 a composer, who thus publicly expresses her intention to author a work. 
Moreover, even in this case, the declaration of existence must be recognised as 
valid by a community of listeners, concert goers, critics, etc.4 Performers of a 
musical work must be acknowledged as agents endowed with the skills for 
performing the work, which are acquired thanks to an appropriate 
apprenticeship,5 and must publicly communicate the intention to perform the 
work (for instance through a concert program). 
2. Correctness and success 
In both cases, musical and gastronomic, declaring one’s intention and being 
able to realize the performance of the musical work or the dish are not sufficient 
conditions to adequately perform the work or prepare the dish. The 
performance presents the work and the dish instantiates the recipe if the 
instructions are followed in a sufficiently correct way. Two questions then arise. 
The first is how to achieve and how to assess this sufficient correctness. The 
second is whether the correctness with respect to the instructions is sufficient 
and/or necessary to guarantee the instantiation of the work/recipe and the 
success of the dish and of the performance. 
With respect to the first question, many6 are tempted to answer that the 
correctness of the performance (and of the dish) depends on satisfying the 
author’s intentions, presented in the score (or in the recipe) or elsewhere 
(letters, diaries, etc.), or obtainable by considering cultural conventions in place 
at the time of the composition (or of the recipe).  
With respect to the second question, a reasonable answer (at least with 
respect to the musical case) seems to be that correctness is sufficient for the 
presentation of the musical work, even if this alone does not guarantee the 
 
3 Titles may be assigned to cultural works by agents others than composers. On the role of titles 
for artworks see Levinson 1990, pp. 159-178. 
4 Contrary to what one anonymous reviewer observed, my intuition is that compositions that never 
receive recognition from some kind of public (at least a small cultural niche) do not have the 
«aesthetic value of a musical work». At least I cannot find any example of such a case. 
5 As I hope it will be clear later (see Section 4), the appropriateness of the apprenticeship cannot 
be judged externally to the very practice in which the apprenticeship is involved. The norms of 
human practices are not external to those practices, but are formed and transformed by the 
practices themselves. See Bertinetto & Bertram 2020. 
6 Regarding music paradigmatic of this view are Davies 2001; Davies 2002; Davies 2012. 
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artistic success of the performance. On the one hand a correct musical 
performance may be shallow or expressively uninspired. On the other hand, two 
performances, both correct, could vary in their artistic success due to their 
different performative styles.7 But is correctness also necessary for a successful 
performance, or for a successful dish? 
No. Artistic success can trump correctness with respect to (some) authorial 
intentions or historical accuracy to the point where the violation of the 
instructions for the performative realization of the musical work can result in an 
artistic success.8 A performance can be artistically successful even though it is 
incorrect from the point of view of score compliance and faithfulness to its 
author’s intentions. This occurs when the performance is able to provoke the 
transformation of the aesthetic criteria by which is to be judged, so that the 
transgression of the scored instructions does not yield a demerit, but an artistic 
merit. For example Andreas Staier’s performance of Mozart’s Rondò alla Turca 
takes two of the intentions that Mozart seems to understand as fundamental for 
the performance of his Rondo alla Turca as contradictory and chooses to satisfy 
one at the expense of the other9. In order to convey to the contemporary public 
the orientalism that Mozart intended to entrust to his music, this performance 
departs significantly from the Mozart’s score, since this is deemed no longer 
able to express the content intended by Mozart. Here departures form the score 
seems then required by fidelity to the work (see Kania 2020, pp. 190-195). 
But there are more radical cases, such as Jimi Hendrix’s famous rock version 
of the American National Anthem performed with his distorted electric guitar at 
Woodstock, 1969 (see Bartel 2011). At least part of this performance’s success 
is due to the pragmatic implications of the musical references to the political 
situation of the time and, in particular, to Vietnam war (see Bertinetto 2017, p. 
10). The performance adds meanings to the work. 
A similar situation can also occur in the culinary field. Disregarding some of 
the instructions provided by the recipe is not always the cause of the failure of 
the dish. The creation of a dish that violates, intentionally or unintentionally, the 
instructions provided by a recipe can lead to gastronomic success (see Section 
 
7 For example, think of two performances of the same Beethoven’s Piano Sonata n. 2, such as those 
of Wilhelm Kempff and Stanislav Richter. 
8 Of course the issue is controversial. See Sherman 1997 for a very well informed musicological 
exploration of the topic. Philosophical accounts are offered by Kivy 1995, and more recently by 
Bertinetto 2019a and Kania 2020. Both discuss also the view defended by Dodd 2015. 
9 Cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEcZLbY8f2k. 
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5). I am referring for example to instructions regarding cooking lengths or the 
use of specific ingredients as well as to habits and conventions with respect to 
taste that are manifested in various culinary and gastronomic precepts (such as 
that of not accompanying fish with red wine). 
Thus the question of musical or gastronomic success does not coincide with 
that of ontological respect for the identity of the musical work or of the recipe. 
In both cases, the violation of normative constraints may bring about the success 
of the performance or of the dish and may lead to the generation of a new musical 
work or recipe, although related to the one from which it derives. Depending on 
how the performance or the dish are considered by the participants, they can be 
understood as versions (or covers) of the ‘original’ work, or as a musical 
performance or a dish that instantiates a different musical work or a different 
recipe,10 or both.11 For example, due to its artistic meaning, which includes a 
declared civil commitment, Hendrix's performance can be considered not only 
as a revolutionary version of the American National Anthem, but as a new 
musical work as well. Similarly, there may be different versions of carbonara 
pasta: with or without cream, with or without egg whites, etc. Moreover, a 
version of a traditional meal ‘signed' by a renowned chef can become a new 
recipe, an author’s recipe (again, the cook may become a chef renowned for her 
creativity precisely thanks to the invention of that dish). After all, whether the 
musical piece or the recipe offered by the performance or by the dish is the same 
piece or the same recipe altered through the performance or through the dish, 
or a new piece or a new recipe generated by the innovative performance or the 
innovative dish depends on whether or not the participants in the practice are 
willing to attribute a strong authorship to the musician or to the cook. Which, 
in turn, can depend on several reasons, not least economic ones, and must be 
decided on a case by case basis12. 
 
10 For instance, the ornamentations of Yuia Wang’s version of Mozart’s Rondò alla Turca (cf. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NJdzGLK3gfc) are so radical that this is credited as an 
arrangement, and not as a rendition, of Mozart’s work (cf. Kania 2020, p. 190). However, this 
categorization may change with time (along with Mozart’s piece) and in any case I still think that a 
music critic imbued with musical traditions less tied to the ‘sacral’ rigidity of the musical work than 
is the Western ‘Classical’ musical tradition can easily understand Wang’s version as a 
performance of that work. 
11 The issue has been discussed in reference to music in Bertinetto 2016a, pp. 19-30; 219-231; 
321-324. 
12 A pragmatic criterion for deciding whether a piece (considered in a given historical period) is a   
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It is known, for instance, the case of the great saxophonist Charlie Parker, 
who, not receiving royalties as an improviser, was forced to transform himself 
into the author of ‘new’ compositions by appropriating the harmonic grid of an 
old standard and using an improvised melody as theme of a ‘new’ tune. Like the 
American National Anthem, which derives from an earlier English song, many 
of Parker’s compositions are indeed ‘contrafacts’: tunes composed by 
appropriating other tunes (cf. Bertinetto 2013; Bertinetto 2016a, ch. 6). We 
can find similar cases in the culinary field. The version of an old recipe can be 
considered as a new recipe depending on the chef’s creativity and on her ability 
to be publicly acknowledged as an author and not only as a (however creative) 
performer of inherited recipes. Whether a «dish is or is not a rendition of a 
recipe» (Borghini 2015, pp. 727-8), and not a failed attempt or a completely new 
creation, will depend on the produced artifact as well as on the cook’s 
declaration of intention and on its acceptance within the community of 
aficionados and experts. For this reason, ‘strange’ dishes, like Ferran Adriá’s 
‘deconstructed tortilla de patatas’13 and Massimo Bottura’s ‘bollito non bollito’, 
are not, respectively, failed (incorrect and inauthentic) ’tortilla de patatas’ and 
‘bollito’. As the results of creative re-appropriations of traditional Spanish and 
Italian recipes, they can be not only new versions of the traditional recipes or 
new forms of existence of the old recipes, contributing to their evolution, but 
even the first forms of existence of new recipes, depending on how the chefs’ 
operation, based on various practical factors, are evaluated (cf. Perullo 2011b, 
p. 230).  
Analogously, whether Jimi Hendrix’s Woodstock performance of the 
American national anthem and Staier’s performance of the Rondò alla Turca are 
incorrect versions of a musical work, correct versions of a musical work (given 
the new cultural context) or instances of a new musical work, or maybe all this at 
once, depends on how they are received by musical communities. Different 
musical communities may consider and treat them differently and the work’s 
identity varies depending on the way they are culturally considered and treated. 
 
work or a version or performance of it could be the presence or absence of a dedicated entry in a 
relevant encyclopaedia. 
13 Adriá’s methodology is called «culinary ‘deconstruction, ’which involves the breaking down of 
familiar dishes into their constituent parts, changing the physical identity of at least some of those 
parts, and then reassembling the pieces in new ways, so that the dishes take on different forms 
while retaining sensory connections with their models». Sweeney 2018, p. 5. See Perullo 2011a. 
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To sum up, performances and dishes can be correct in very different ways, 
since sometimes different aspects of the musical or gastronomic work cannot be 
manifested in the same performance or dish. Correctness and success of a 
performance or of a dish do not always coincide. Finally, both in the musical and 
in the gastronomic case, the same item can be considered as a version (or cover) 
of an old work or recipe, as the new form of existence of an old work or recipe, 
or as the instance of a new work or recipe based on a previous work or recipe. 
3. The authentic type/token ontology of musical  
and gastronomic practices 
The analogy between recipes and musical works can be plausible and 
heuristically useful, if it is properly explained in order to help understand the 
human practices in which these cultural artifacts come into existence. My point 
is that dishes and musical performances are interestingly analogous because 
they do not only respectively manifest musical works and recipes, but can 
transform them to the extent that they can also bring about the invention of new 
musical works and recipes. They might not only be more or less accurate ways to 
accede perceptually and epistemically to an unchangeable item (the musical 
work or the recipe): they can both contribute to the evolution and even to the 
inventions of the musical pieces and the recipes they instantiate. This 
transformative power of performance and dishes is consistent with the practical, 
social and cultural nature of artifacts like musical works and recipes as well as 
performances and dishes. 
However, this view contrasts strikingly with an ontological model (still quite 
widespread in the musical domain; cf. Dodd 2007; 2014) which denies that 
performances may contribute to transforming the musical work. In fact, 
according to this ‘Platonist’ model (as it is commonly called) the musical work is 
an immutable entity. Hence, surely, the analogy between musical and culinary 
practices that I am exploring in this article is unlikely to displace the defenders 
of this ontological model from their position. But since this analogy is, 
mistakenly, in my view, occasionally used to reinforce the plausibility of that 
erroneous ontological model and of an equally erroneous conception of musical 
authenticity, elaborating on that analogy in the transformative and pragmatic 
sense I am proposing here could provide an incentive to pursue in their 
theoretical inquiry for those who think that the works of human ingenuity and 
creativity, as cultural artifacts, can change over time, and that this is particularly 
evident in the case of artifacts, such as musical and gastronomic works, which, 
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in order to be offered to listeners and eaters, require a contribution, that can be 
creative, from other agents —performers and cooks14. Or so I contend. 
Let’s start with music, whose ontology appears in the current philosophical 
debate as a model of the ontology of the performing arts, in general (see Davies 
2011). As explained in more detail by Bertinetto (2016a; 2019a; 2020), the 
mainstream model of musical ontology takes as a fact that a musical work is 
possibly manifested in multiple performances. Therefore, it understands 
musical works as types having multiple possible instances or tokens: the musical 
performances. Moreover, it assumes that musical works, as types, are tokened in 
their performances, without undergoing transformations. Performances 
manifest the musical work without modifying it, but simply repeatedly 
portraying it as it is. In other words, the differences between the performances 
do not affect the identity of the work they present. This means that the identity 
of the musical work is established independently of its performances and, in this 
way, it can provide the criterion for the performances’ correctness.  
According to some versions of this view, if a score indicates that at a certain 
temporal point in the performing plan of the piece a certain instrument (say, the 
clavichord) must perform a certain note (say, a G sharp), the performance will be 
correct (authentic as compliant with the score), iff the clavichord at that point 
will play that G sharp, even though, for instance, this note may sound weird to a 
contemporary listener, especially, say, if played precisely by a clavichord, rather 
than by a piano – to whose sound the ears of contemporary listeners are certainly 
much more accustomed15. Otherwise, the performance would be incorrect and 
inauthentic. According to this model, Hendrix’s Woodstock performance of the 
American National Anthem and Staier’s performance of Mozart’s Rondò alla 
Turca are failed performances, because they are strikingly unfaithful to the 
musical pieces they are the performances of, as traditionally and customarily 
performed. 
 
14 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. For the anti-platonic view of 
recipes as artifacts see Sciacca 2020. 
15 Some ‘sonicist’ accounts claim that the correctness of the performance of a work can also be 
achieved with instruments other than those indicated by the composer, if the resulting sound is 
the same (the corresponding situation in the culinary field would be that of a recipe made with 
different ingredients, but capable of achieving the same taste). Other ‘contextualist’ accounts 
claim instead that making the work with the instruments indicated by the composer is part of the 
requirements for a correct performance (the analogue situation in the culinary field would be that 
of a dish that uses the very same ingredients indicated by the inventor of the recipe). See Kania 
2020, pp. 168 ff. 
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Other Platonist accounts of the type-token musical ontology (see Dodd 
2015) allow for a great variability of performances. They believe, for example, 
that playing a musical work with different and more modern instruments, or 
otherwise interpreting it in ways that depart intentionally from the score can be 
excellent ways to manifest the deep musical content of the work, without 
changing it. And they can easily argue that when the performance’s departure 
from the score is too radical, then the performance is not of work a, but of a new 
work, b, discovered precisely through the innovative performance, or of a 
version of work a. All these argumentative solutions (or subterfuges, as a 
malicious adversary of Platonism may say) which I cannot investigate in this 
article (having however done so elsewhere: see Bertinetto 2016a), depend on 
the assumption (which I do not agree with) that the reality of the musical work is 
metaphysical, not cultural and that the composer (who is only a discoverer, not a 
creator16) presents in the score, according with the performance conventions of 
her time, the mandatory instructions for its manifestation through the 
performance. 
Two problems of this view seem to be precisely the interpretative freedom 
granted to interpreters (not only in the adoption of modern instruments), and 
the ontological role of versions. As for interpretative freedom, arguing that even 
moving away from the letter of the score can be a way to manifest the profound 
content of the work runs the risk of being counterproductive for the Platonist17. 
First, this strategy requires distinguishing between a ‘profound’ (or ‘rich’) 
content (manifested by the creative performance that deviates from the score), 
and a ‘superficial’ (or ‘modest’) content (presumably manifested by the correct 
performance in terms of compliance with the the score). Second, however, it 
must be explained in what sense the creative performance — the one capable of 
grasping the profound or rich content of the work — is also a performance 
capable of instantiating the work. 18  And this is not an easy task. Of course, 
correctness is a matter of degree, but if the measure of the degree of correctness 
 
16  Those who, like Levinson (cf. 1990, pp. 215-263), think that the composer is not just a 
discoverer, but a creator, weakens Platonism by embracing a contextualist version of it and 
arousing the criticisms of strong Platonism. 
17 Cf. Kania 2020, 188-197.  
18 In fact, as argued by Kania (2020, p. 195), the point of a correct performance is that it has to 
manifest the content of the work by correctly instantiating the work. Many other things (for 
instance cultural artifacts such as other musical works and artworks, arrangements, literary works, 
critical interpretations etc.) may manifest the content of the musical work without instantiating it 
(neither correctly nor incorrectly). 
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is the score and the creative performance departs from the score, the explanation 
of how creative interpretation is still an instance of the relevant work seems to 
require Platonists to dismiss some of their key assumptions. How can a creative, 
but deviating, performance correctly instantiate the musical work, if the 
criterion for correct instantiation is the score, from which the performance 
deviates? If the Platonist makes cultural conventions come to the aid of the score 
as a criterion for determining whether or not a creative interpretation is still an 
instance of the work at issue, maintaining that the score alone does not represent 
the musical content of the work correctly or completely, then Platonism goes 
towards a contextualist/constructivist weakening, which, I believe, its defenders 
would like to avoid. In fact, cultural conventions change historically, and if the 
identity of the work is consigned to historical mutability, it seems impossible to 
respect the idea of the immutability of the work.  
As for the versions, one line of reasoning to show how they can be used not 
to help the thesis of the immutability of the work defended by Platonism, but on 
the contrary to prove its falsity, could be this: Versions offer new possibilities for 
manifesting the work. Before version b (Staier’s performance) was available, the 
work x (Mozart’s Rondò alla Turca) was always manifested according to version 
a (which however was not known as version a, but simply as work x). When 
version b is realized, work x can be manifested both in version a (as it was always 
manifested in the past), and in version b. This disjunctive possibility (being able 
to be played as a or as b) introduces a change in the work compared to the time 
when version b did not exist. So version b (perhaps produced through a 
performance), transforms work x19. To block this consequence of the theoretical 
use of the notion of version, Platonists cannot but insist that the work is an 
immutable type and that the version is also an immutable type, related with the 
work-type: accordingly, the new version (b) is another entity which manifests 
differently (by means of instantiation), but does not transform, the starting 
immutable type (x). If it does not manifest x by instantiating it, it is not a version, 
but a new work, y20. 
However, this seems to contrast too strikingly with cultural practices. While 
it is true that versions of musical works are commonly spoken of as artifacts that 
allow a certain work, x, to be manifested in different ways, it is also true that a 
new version introduces a new way of accessing x. It seems reasonable to me to 
 
19 I take this argument from Terrone 2017. 
20 This seems to be, at least in part, García-Carril Puy's (2019) line of argument, if I understand 
it correctly. 
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argue that (at least if x is a work of art21) the manifestation of x is part of the 
ontological set of x. Version b introduces a new (possibility of) manifestation of 
x. So version b changes work x. Moreover I do not see any plausible reason to 
deny that a version can produce a new work y. This occurs when the changes 
introduced by the version are so strong that the manifestation of the work x leads 
to another work, y, which in cultural practices is picked out separately from x, or, 
in other words, to which a specific entry is dedicated in a relevant encyclopaedia. 
To cut a long story short, it is the moving magma of cultural practices that 
determines, in a revisable way, whether version b changes work x, providing a 
new possibility of manifestation, or adds another work, y, to the world22.  
Analogous views can be applied to the relation between a recipe and the 
dishes instancing it. It could be argued that a recipe is a type tokened by dishes 
without transforming its identity. The recipe’s identity is allegedly established 
independently of the dishes that instantiate it and provides the criterion for the 
correctness (authenticity) of the dishes. This seems to be implied in what Stan 
Godlovitch thinks: through the analogy of an ancient recipe he defends a 
‘philological’ view of the authenticity of musical performances. As he claims, just 
as the preparation of a dish based on an ancient recipe must not adapt the recipe 
to contemporary conditions – because this adaptation would allegedly bring 
about illegitimated changes in the identity of the recipe – but reproduce what is 
indicated in the recipe, based on the original historical situations, a musical 
performance must not adapt to contemporary conditions, but be faithful to the 
text of the score, which, so his story goes, provides the only valid requirements 
for the correctness of the performance of the work as intended by its author. 
Accordingly, the aim of preparing a salad following a fourteenth-century recipe 
is «not tracking down the taste sensation of a fourteenth-century salad-eater. 
The recipe never promises that we can taste what they tasted.» Instead, the point 
would be getting a «good reason to think that we can at least prepare salad much 
 
21 I can’t argue about it here, but I think this also applies to conceptual art. 
22 I am aware that this thesis should be corroborated by some solid reflection that explains my 
commitment to the thesis according to which the ontology of music (and most generally the 
ontology of art) must respect practices, since artworks have the sort of properties are attributed to 
them in appreciative and critical practices (the so-called «pragmatic constraint»: cf. Davies 2004), 
and I an aware that the defence of this view may require an ontology of practices. Not having the 
space to carry out this task here, I limit myself to assuming that cultural practices are historically 
changing normative contexts that govern human interactions which in turn contribute to changing 
practices. In relation to artistic practices, I share the views and the arguments developed by 
Bertram 2019. 
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as they did (…)» (Godlovitch 1999, p. 162). Analogously, Godlovitch thinks, the 
aim of a performance of an old musical work is not to experience the original 
listeners’ auditory sensations, but to perform the old musical work as it is. 
Consequently, following Godlovitch, Staier’s performance of the Rondò alla 
Turca is inauthentic and incorrect.  
However, this view is undermined by three problems concerning the musical 
work/performances and the recipe/dishes relationships, as well as listeners’ 
and eaters’ experiences. 
1. Is it possible to establish the identity of the musical work/recipe (i.e. what 
the musical work/recipe are) independently of their realizations by means of 
performances and dishes? 
2. Is it impossible, or illegitimate, that performances and dishes transform the 
identity of the musical or culinary work? 
3. Is the experience, and the pleasure, of listeners and eaters really superfluous 
or irrelevant when it comes to manifesting the (content of) the musical or 
culinary work through the performance/dish? 
All these three questions must be answered in the negative. 
1. The assumption made by the mainstream ontological model of the musical 
work according to which the identity of the musical work, as type, is established 
independently of the performances that are its tokens, is unwarranted. In fact, 
the sense by which a musical work or a recipe is identified by examining the score 
or the text is much weaker than that by which a musical work or a recipe is 
identified by the performance or by the dish. If a performance or a dish that 
contains inaccuracies with respect to what is indicated in the score or in the text 
of the recipe are incorrect manifestations of the work or of the recipe in this 
regard, what should we say of a performance or a of dish only imagined by means 
of reading of the score or the text? In a sense, in these cases all the indications 
for the manifestation of the work are disregarded, because the musical work or 
the recipe are not manifested at all through the performance or the dish 23 . 
 
23 A similar line of reasoning can also be adopted to reject the possible objection that the view I 
am defending fails to account for the identification of works that have never been performed. If I 
had the space to articulate here an answer to this possible objection, I would base it on the idea 
that the sense for which a composition or a recipe never performed really is a proper musical or 
gastronomic work is, to say the least, much weaker than the sense for which compositions and 
recipes are works manifested in performances and dishes. 
           Dishes as Performances                                                          123 
 
Musical works — and something similar can be said of gastronomic ones — are 
concretely real, as music, only thanks to their performances that offer them to 
listening experience: otherwise they exist as cultural constructs, physically 
indicated by scores. Many key qualities that make them the musical works they 
are are grasped only by virtue of listening to their performances that form (and, 
as I will suggest soon, transform!) their identities as cultural constructs. The 
sonic nature of the musical work, as well as the gustatory nature of a recipe, seem 
to be relevant to its identity. Moreover, few Platonists would be willing to deny 
the relevance of the sound structure (or, in the case of a recipe, of the gustatory 
qualities) for the identification of the work. Therefore the performance or the 
dish seems required to identify in a robust way a musical or gastronomic work 
‘savoring' its properties24. 
2. Assuming the answer to the first question is acceptable, I see no reason to 
deny that musical or gastronomic works which are identified, thanks to their 
performances and dishes, can also be transformed by virtue of these 
manifestations. I do not want to get rid of the type/token ontology altogether 
here. In fact, it is fairly reasonable to conceive of a musical work as a type capable 
of having different tokens (its performances). The type/token ontology is an 
elegant way to explain both how to recognize a musical performance as the 
performance of a certain musical work and, consequently, to establish the 
requirements that a performance should satisfy in order to be a performance of 
a certain work. The same can be said of the relation between a recipe and the 
dishes that manifest it25. But inferring then that the musical or the gastronomic 
work has an identity independently of its performances/dishes, of the ways in 
which they are experienced and of evaluations and judgments of cultural 
communities and that it cannot be modified (both in fact and in law) by its 
performances/dishes and by the ways in which they are received (by means of 
listening and eating) seems to be a misstep. The identity of musical works (and 
 
24 I thank very much an anonymous reviewer for pressing on this point. 
25 Therefore, although I share with Moruzzi 2018 and Sciacca 2020 the idea that musical works and 
recipes can change over time due to the transformations produced by performances and dishes, I do 
not think it necessary to reject the type/token scheme to understand the relationship between 
musical and gastronomic works on the one hand, and performances and dishes on the other. The view 
of works and recipes as cultural objects whose identity varies depending on the ways they are 
performed in changing cultural contexts by musical performances and dishes through which they are 
perceived and savored can be well explained by understanding types as quasi-abstract particulars 
extended through time and transformable by their tokens in the same way that an action can modify 
the corresponding action plan while realizing it. See Sections 4 and 5.  
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something very similar can be said of gastronomic artifacts) is negotiated by 
their performances which shape them sonically in different ways, adapting them 
to specific performing spaces, specific audiences, and specific cultural aims, 
thereby possibly transforming them to different extents. Hence, the assumption 
of the immutability of the musical work through its manifestations is unrealistic: 
it clashes with what happens in musical practices. This assumption is wrong 
because it takes as a metaphysical truth a cultural ideology – the Werktreue ideal, 
the ideal of fidelity to the Work with capital ‘W’ – which (of course in different 
ways26) governed a particular historical Western musical tradition (cf. Goehr 
1992; Ridley 2003). Yet nothing, apart from cultural prescriptive constraints of 
the ideological stripe, prevents tokens from inducing changes in the type they 
instantiate, precisely through the way in which they instantiate it, realizing it in 
specific cultural and environmental circumstances. 
Hence, even though from a descriptive point of view the issue of authenticity 
seems simple and factual (not ‘value-laden’) — a dish is authentic if it matches its 
recipe intended as a reference category; a musical performance is authentic if it 
matches its work as a reference category — the reference category is not fixed 
and not independent from aesthetic and other values27. The authenticity of a 
performance (or of a dish) can be assessed only thanks to experience and 
evaluation of performances (and dishes) within changing cultural contexts, 
linked to different and changing cultural and aesthetic ideals. 
3. In order to argue (in the last part of this Section and in Section 4) in 
defence of this view, I now question the relevance of listeners’ and eaters’ 
experience for the way performances and dishes manifest the musical or 
gastronomic work. What I just said of musical works applies very well to the 
gastronomic case as well. There is no way to establish how to comply 
‘authentically’ with instructions provided by an ancient recipe independently of 
their realizations through dishes produced by contemporary cooks and eaten by 
contemporary diners (cf. Montanari 2015, pp. 13f.). As in the case of musical 
works of the Baroque era (for example), composed or readapted for specific 
 
26 For example, as previously seen, some understand fidelity to the work as fidelity to the text (the 
score), others as fidelity to the ‘rich’ or ‘profound’ content of the work (whatever is meant by it). 
27 Therefore I do not think that the question of authenticity (at least in reference to food and 
music) can be resolved simply by resorting to Walton's ‘categorialism’ (see Walton 1970), as 
Strohl 2019 seems (partly, at least) to believe. I have clarified my view on Walton's ‘categorialism’ 
in Bertinetto 2019b and 2020. I thank an anonymous reviewer for making me aware of Strohl’s 
paper. 
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occasions, for specific interpreters, and for specific audiences, it is impossible 
to establish the authentic essential and a-historical Identity (with capital ‘I’) of 
recipes prepared taking into account the specific occasion to which they had to 
serve, in terms of local traditions, availability of ingredients, diners’ tastes, etc. 
Not only the correctness of a dish with respect to the recipe would depend on 
the practices in which different agents (recipe’s authors, cooks, restaurant-
goers, aficionados, experts, etc.) are involved. Rather, following philologically 
all the instructions established by the letter of the recipe may involve betraying 
the author’s intentions with respect to the taste qualities of the dish. Tastes and 
culinary habits change with time and a recipe that once seemed cheap, can today 
be a refined gastronomic proposal; a dish once considered tasty, can be too 
strong and indigestible for the contemporary palate. As Montanari (2015, p. 14) 
writes,  
 
(…) it is not at all the case that philological fidelity to the text is the best way to 
re-create the sensation of the past. The very opposite can occur; that is, the 
highest degree of adaptation – knowledgeably controlled – may turn out to be 
much more faithful than formal fidelity. To take one example, the mortar and 
pestle are very different from an electric blender, and the consistencies 
obtained from the two utensils are also very different. However, in our 
experience it is the blender that works best to ‘grind finely,’ as did the mortar 
during the Middle Ages. The two sensations, objectively very unalike, can 
coincide on a subjective level, but we will never know for sure. 
 
Peter Kivy (2002, pp. 224-250) advanced analogous arguments with respect to 
musical authenticity. In order to satisfy the author’s intentions with respect to 
the sonic effects of a Baroque orchestra, instructions regarding the instrumental 
equipment of the orchestra must be disregarded. Accustomed as we are to large 
orchestras, today the solemnity that Bach wanted sometimes to achieve with the 
orchestras of his time, small in size, can only be achieved adopting much larger 
orchestras. In other words, our acoustic perception is accustomed to sounds 
different from those used by the listeners of the Bach era. So to obtain the 
aesthetic effects allegedly intended by Bach as constitutive of the correctness of 
the performance of his compositions, today performers must adapt Bach's music 
to different listening situations and to different listeners. More generally, 
instructions for performing a musical work are effective if they suit the concrete 
performative situation in which they are applied. Even when they aim to present 
the work faithfully, musical performances appropriate the musical content 
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conveyed by the score or by the recording and adapt it to the performing 
situation, which is specific in material, technical, historical, social, cultural, 
aesthetics, and artistic terms, and could not be anticipated by the composers of 
the piece. So, performers variously understand, integrate, interpolate, and 
appropriate the information provided by scores or recordings. For instance, the 
acoustics of a concert hall can induce a conductor to make decisions about how 
to concretely perform a musical work – for example, regarding the spatial 
arrangement or the orchestral crew or the musical tempo – that violate the 
score’s indications. Moreover, aesthetic considerations can induce musicians to 
perform the work in ways unthinkable for her composer (just think of Glenn 
Gould’s famous Bach performances, or the previous discussed Staier’s 
performance of the Rondò alla Turca). 
My point is that creative interpretations and adaptations and interpretive 
appropriations lead – to different degrees – to transformations of the musical 
work.28 In order to perform the work correctly (‘authentically’) it is not enough 
to appeal to the rules valid in the musical practices in force in the historical-
cultural context of the era in which the work has been composed. Performers 
must take into account the way in which normative instructions can be 
implemented in their specific performance situation, in terms of instruments, 
acoustics and cultural taste. And these interpretations feed back the work and 
modify it, at least because subsequent performances will consider how the work 
has been performed by the interpretative performance. To put it with Gadamer 
(2006), the work is (trans)formed by the history of its effects: its 
Wirkungsgeschichte. The acoustic, environmental, and cultural conditions of 
interpretation and fruition of the work retroactively affect its musical content, 
including the rules for its performances 29 . In other words, the criterion of 
correctness, and of success, of performances is dependent (partly, at least) on 
cultural and environmental conditions. And not only that: performances also 
contribute to changing the criteria of correctness and of success, thereby 
impacting the cultural context of their practice. Think again of the Rondò alla 
 
28 Of course, this s not Kivy’s view. His ‘Platonist’ view of musical ontology contrasts blatantly 
with his pluralist and dynamic view of musical authenticity. A very similar objection is addressed 
to Dodd by Kania (2020, pp. 195-196). 
29 It is certainly possible to (try to) perform a musical work as it would have been performed at the 
era of its composition and of its first performers. However, the result of this operation would be a 
today’s performance of a work as it is now thought that this work would have been performed at 
the time of its composition (see Taruskin 1995 and Cook 2013 for musicological developments 
of this insight).  
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Turca example: Staier’s performance influences the criterion of correctness of 
Mozart's work’s performances, possibly changing the cultural conventions on 
which the performance of the work is based. 
However, misunderstandings may arise about the use I make of the notion of 
‘retroactivity’30. So a clarification is in order here. A performance retroactively 
transforms the musical content of a musical work and therefore also the rules for 
the performance not in the counterintuitive sense that now the way in which in 
the past the work was considered to have been performed correctly is no longer 
correct or that on the contrary a performance that was incorrect in 1920 is 
correct in 202031, but in the sense that by applying what is considered the rule 
for the correct manifestation of the work, changes are introduced which 
ultimately transform the rule to be applied for performing the work. In other 
words — I will come back to this point in Section 4 — the application of the rule 
may transform the rule. If, to return to the previous example, I play the Rondò 
alla Turca in a more oriental way in order to render today the oriental sense that 
Mozart intended as a structural property of his work, I modify different sound 
properties of the work (in terms of melody, rhythm, touch, expressiveness…) 
through which Mozart intended to convey the quality of orientalism. To apply 
the rule, therefore, I am changing it, both because now the performances of the 
work can choose whether to satisfy the rule by performing the work in the old 
way or by following the novelty I introduced (and this simple new disjunctive 
possibility alters the rule) and because future performances may take my new 
performance as a reference — in turn adapting it to the new performative 
situations, and thus continuing the transformation of the work. Hence, in a 
‘Waltonian’ vein, it could be said that the innovative performance changes the 
reference category to which it belongs. Obviously, the modification is valid from 
now on (and for those who accept the ‘orientalizing’ performance as valid): it 
does not affect the performances of the past — even though it may have an impact 
on the contemporary evaluations of recordings of performances of the past: in 
this sense it really is so that a performance, that was considered successful 
at t, can be considered defective starting from t+1, because a new performance 
(or set of performances) has changed (what we now take as) the (authentic!!) 
musical content of the work. The retroactivity, therefore, is not so much 
 
30 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. 
31  Actually I believe that our feeling when listening to the recordings of old performances of 
musical works is precisely this, but in fact it can only be a feeling, since the fact that different rules 
apply now at time t+1 does not change the fact that other rules were in force in the past at time t. 
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temporal — although now we may regard the once considered failed performance 
as interestingly anticipating a way that is today considered correct and/or 
successful for performing the work, and the once considered correct 
performance as an old, now not very compelling, way of satisfying the norms for 
correctness — but structural, and maybe a better term than retroactivity may then 
perhaps be recursivity: the application of the rule (i.e. the performance of the 
work) recursively transforms the rule (the work) precisely by applying it. 
Be that as it may, the gist of my view is that the identity of the musical work is 
negotiated within the practice. It cannot be determined independently of 
performing and listening practices, and cannot be considered as the external 
normative criterium for evaluating performances. A musical work’s properties 
(i.e. its identity) are specified by performances and evaluations in musical 
practices (based also on testimonies and documents like scores, composers’ and 
interpreters’ annotations, critical literature, recordings, transcriptions, etc.) 
that are historically and culturally changeable and that take into account 
performers’ and listeners’ experience and taste. Performances, as 
interpretations, are evaluative; evaluations are performative, in that they impact 
on the identity of the musical work. As cultural constructs, musical works are 
ontologically flexible, because they are (trans)formed by the performances that 
adapt them to a specific physical and cultural situation in order to offer them 
to listeners. Performative and critical interpretations (cf. Levinson 1993) 
affect artistic properties of a musical work and its identity as a cultural 
artifact. So the plausibility of the idea that the type/token dichotomy 
elegantly explains the relationship between the musical (or culinary) work 
and its multiple performances (or the dishes that manifest it) does not 
contrast with the rejection of the immutability of the musical (or culinary) 
work. Rather, the idea that performances should match immutable musical 
works fails as a criterion for evaluating correctness and success of musical 
performances. 
The moral of the story is that if the tasty analogy between the musical and 
the culinary fields is sound, which it is, then recipes are also not immutable, 
since they are transformed by the normative relationship that connects them 
to their performances: the dishes. The transformations of the recipe may be 
due to the need of adapting it to the concrete circumstances of the meal, to 
eaters’ culinary preferences, to the ingredients available, to the cook’s 
creativity etc. Pace Godlovitch, recipes are, like musical works, changing 
cultural artifacts. Hence the preparation of a dish based on an ancient recipe 
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cannot serve as independent example for defending that musical 
performances must simply manifest or mirror the musical work as it is (or 
was!). The musical work and the recipe are not the criteria of validity of the 
authenticity of the musical or culinary performances detached from the 
concrete performing and culinary practices, but are involved in the practices 
that they regulate. Their normative role is played in the concrete cultural-
historical and empirical situations in which they are offered to musical and 
gastronomic appreciation. Authenticity itself — in a more interesting sense 
than that of the factual belonging to a category — is a process by which 
authority is attributed to a cultural construct. As such it is negotiated in the 
practice.32 Hence, in order to be effectively and authentically realized by 
performances and dishes, musical works and culinary recipes are 
transformed according to the concrete situations in which they are offered 
to appreciators. 
4. Improvisational normativity in action, while 
cooking and making music  
As already suggested, the normativity ruling the work/performance relationship, 
as well as the recipe/dishes relation, is dynamic and situated: norms are 
(trans)formed through their concrete applications. Tokens applying the type 
(the norm) adapt the norm to the specific situation. On the one hand, only in 
this way they can satisfy the norm; on the other hand this adaptation transforms 
the norm. This is the ordinary case in cultural practices – artistic, and 
gastronomic, practices included. 
In order to account for the transformative character of the normativity of 
musical (and, more generally, artistic) practices, it has been argued that 
improvisation is paradigmatic for the musical practice as a whole, and more 
generally for art (cf. Bertinetto 2020). In fact, the concrete normativity of a 
musical improvisation is generated during the performance itself. Although 
based on material and cultural preconditions of different kinds, its normative 
validity emerges through improvisational interactions with and within the 
performance situation. So the sense of an improvised musical passage – and the 
same could also be said of actions, gestures and speeches of improvising 
actresses and dancers – does not depend on the producers’ intentions, but 
 
32 The notion of ‘authenticity’ as individual and social process of authentication is discussed, also 
in relation to food and musical issues, in Cobb 2014. 
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emerges retroactively thanks to the responses it causes (see also Bertinetto 
2019b). For example, in a musical improvisation, the pianist’s phrase acquires 
its musical sense thanks to the saxophonist’s response to it. The piano phrase, 
as any other musical contribution during the performance, makes sense by 
virtue of the concrete musical interactions in which it takes its place (see 
Bertram 2010). 
This retroactive and transformative model of improvisational normativity 
explains the dynamic relationship between the musical work and its 
performances. The musical work prepares the conditions regulating and 
constraining the performance, but the concrete sense of these conditions and 
normative constraints emerges through the musical performances that ‘respond’ 
to them while applying them in specific situations, thereby (trans)forming the 
artistic sense of the musical work and its identity as cultural construct. In other 
terms, the musical content of a musical work is (trans)formed not only by the 
composer, but also by creative interpretations. That is why a musical work can 
change. 
This also holds in the gastronomic case. For instance, some instructions of a 
recipe can be characterized by a vagueness such as to require the cook’s creative 
contribution. To determine how much salt is a pinch of salt, the cook will resort 
to the conventions she is accustomed to in the context of the community in which 
she works, to dietary recommendations and, ultimately, to her personal taste. 
Furthermore, the specific context of the meal in which the dish will be served 
can influence the cook’s decisions. The very spicy flavor of a first course (a dish 
of penne all’arrabbiata, for example) may make it appropriate to make the 
second course tastier, precisely in order to be faithful to the (interpretation of 
the) recipe. Within the context of a concert similar considerations may, for 
example, make it appropriate to speed up the performance of a piece of music 
following a very fast song, so that the second piece does not seem too slow. 
Therefore, even the respect of certain intentions of the author of the work or 
recipe may make it necessary to neglect or even violate other intentions. Like in 
the Staier/Mozart example: respect for an aspect of the musical content of the 
Rondò (orientalism) may induce the performer to disregard another aspect (the 
notes of the score). The decision as to what the respective normative weight of 
the author’s different intentions is in relation to the musical piece/recipe is up 
to the performer/cook: at the end of the day, the normativity that regulates the 
musical and culinary practice is developed within the practice itself, like in an 
improvisation. 
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Just as performances of a musical work do not repeat the work without 
modifying it, but adapt the score using it as an ingredient of the performance (as 
it is paradigmatically clear in standard jazz: see Feige 2014), in cooking, recipes 
– i.e. the instructions that guide the preparation of a dish – are appropriated and 
transformed, more or less intentionally, and to a greater or lesser degree. While 
producing the dish, recipes are used, and abused. Hence, it makes sense to say 
that in this way a recipe becomes an ingredient of the final product: the dish 
through which it is performed (cf. Bertinetto 2012, p. 120)33. 
In other words, both in artistic performances and dishes, the application of 
norms requires a ‘creative’ adaptation to the concrete specific situation and the 
final product emerges out of practical interactions that involve transformations 
of their own normative starting bases. Both in culinary practices and performing 
arts, the improvisational case is paramount for understanding how their 
normativity, as paradigmatic of the normativity of human practices in general, 
works. 
 
33  Obviously enough a recipe (and even less the piece of paper that instantiates the text in a 
cookbook) is not an ingredient of the dish in the same sense as salt, meat, eggs and the like are 
ingredients of a dish that result from the act of cooking, i.e. concrete material parts of the concrete 
and material product. In fact, recipes (and musical works) are quasi-abstract entities (quasi-
abstract, since, although they have not material parts — but only material instances — they are 
extended through time). Yet, in another sense the recipe, as quasi-abstract cultural object, is an 
ingredient of the dish, since, if differently from the material components of the dish, it enters into 
the dish (‘ingredient’ comes form the Latin ingrediens’, the present participle of ‘ingredi’: ‘to 
enter’) as the dish manifests (while possibly modifying) it in concrete situations. Maybe, this way 
of saying is close to expressions like ‘care and creativity are ingredients of this dish’, which, I think, 
are ordinary, and understandable, ways of saying, when what is meant is that care and creativity are 
resources (attitudes, skills, knowledge, etc.) which, as can be the case with a recipe, are made 
available to the culinary performance that creates a dish. But the anonymous reviewer that pressed 
me on this point (and I thank her for that) may possibly think that my use of ‘ingredient’ is 
confusing for readers and that I should clarify, as I have just done, that I am actually mixing the two 
senses of ‘ingredient’. However, I also think that this possible confusion is a price to pay that is 
not too high if it helps making readers understand my main point: the transformative and creative, 
and not merely passive, power that a performance (as well as the creation of a dish) can have on 
musical (and culinary) works. If Platonists find a foothold in this possible confusion to confirm 
their view, it doesn't worry me that much, since I don't think my view can convince Platonists to 
change their thesis. Certainly, however, Platonists will have to offer an explanation of the way in 
which they can support at the same time the thesis of the immutability of the work and that of the 
creativity of interpretation in the performance of the work, which on my view are indeed not 
compatible. 
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This idea is confirmed by recent developments in the philosophy of action 
and material culture that highlight the role of improvisation for human action. 
Musical works and recipes may be thought of as plans requiring improvisation in 
order to be enacted. As persuasively argued by Beth Preston (2013), in human 
practices the realization of any project, and action plan, requires improvisation. 
The «centralized control model» of action, as Preston calls it, is a model of action 
of Aristotelian origin, adopted by most of contemporary philosophy of action, 
according to which human action is articulated into two separate phases: the 
intelligent preparation of plans and intentions and their subsequent execution. 
Countering this model, she plausibly defends the mutual link between planning 
and execution, as well as the active role played by performances in specific 
circumstances for determining the plans themselves.  
First, the very structuring of a plan usually requires changes from the initial 
idea to account for changes in the situation. In other words, the design itself is a 
situated action (Suchman 2007). A plan, a rule of action, cannot simply be 
imposed on a situation, but must adapt to the situation in order to be realized. 
This adaptation involves the retroactive and transformative impact of the action 
on the plan. Second, the transition from an action plan to the realization of the 
action involves choices not determined by the plan, but suggested or 
constrained by the concrete circumstances in which the plan is implemented. 
The plan does not regulate its own realization (cf. Wittgenstein 1953), but 
emerges out of the situated (inter)action. 
The natural, social and cultural environment is dynamic and can change both 
during the development phase of a plan prior to action, and during the phase of 
realization of a plan through action (Pollack 1992). In order to be effective, 
human plans must be able to be modified, adapting plastically to environmental 
changes. The development of plans and projects takes place through the 
dynamic network of interactions in which human beings are involved: they are 
structured through concrete activities. Projects are determined through their 
realization, which requires adaptation to concrete circumstances and revisions: 
in other words, it requires improvisation. Hence, Preston draws the conclusion 
that improvisation is the fundamental trait of human action. In fact, plans, as 
normative networks of intentions of actions, must plastically adapt to a changing 
reality that they cannot anticipate. Plans are not algorithms (cf. Bertinetto & 
Bertram 2020), and human action does not function on the basis of a structured 
theoretical knowledge separated from the actual performance, but on the basis 
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of the artisan model of a situated know-how generated through concrete 
performances (cf. Sennett 2008), i.e. ex improviso. 
Musical and gastronomic practices are paradigmatic examples (along with 
many others) of this improvisational normativity of human action. On the one 
hand, this applies to the design of a musical work or a recipe. Usually, the 
composer of a piece (a sonata, a symphony, a song, etc.) takes into account, 
consciously or unconsciously, specific cultural and environmental conditions: 
aesthetic criteria and habits, instruments, acoustics, performing spaces, and in 
many cases, also individual performers. Similarly, recipes are gastronomic 
projects that take into account the environmental and cultural situation in which 
the writer of the recipe is involved, as well as concrete alimentary, technological 
and human resources. 
On the other hand, both cooks and performers fulfil a plan, the musical work 
or the recipe, adapting it to circumstances not predetermined by the plan. In 
order to do so, they go beyond what is prescribed in the plan, and improvise on 
the plan, in order to fulfil it. First, musical works and recipes, as action plans, 
are partly indeterminate, and their realization requires musicians and cooks to 
make decisions regarding what to do concretely in order to fulfil the plan: for 
instance, if the score indicates that a passage must be played ff, the performer 
will determine from time to time what the indication ff means in the specific 
performative situation; if a cook has to prepare a pesto, it will be up to her to 
decide (also based on the resources available) which kind of basil to use. And it 
will be the judgment of a community of listeners and eaters to evaluate the 
success or failure of the musical performance and of the dish, as well as their 
correctness and authenticity with respect to the musical work and recipe at issue. 
Second, musical works and recipes are also appropriated by musicians and 
cooks, who re-elaborate them creatively in order to express their own creative 
personality. In this regard, Richard Sennett offers a nice example from the 
gastronomic field, presenting the different ways in which a recipe (or maybe 
better: a field of recipes), the ‘Poulet à la d’Albufera’, is appropriated, 
interpreted, and narrated by cooking teachers who (trans)form it in original 
ways, following their preferences and their specific biographic situations 
(Sennett 2008, pp. 182-193). 
5. Cooks as improvisers 
One might wonder why the notion of ‘improvisation’ is used in reference to the 
situated performance of action plans and the adaptive applications of norms such 
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as musical works and recipes. Does not the notion of ‘interpretation’ already 
serve to stress the performative and transformative aspect of music and 
gastronomic practices (as suggested by Valgenti 2014)? In some respects the 
two notions indeed overlap. Those who improvise are often also interpreting, 
working with and on inherited cultural materials already available that are 
appropriated for original creations: for example, a jazz standard or a traditional 
dish that is reworked through the cook’s or the musician’s personal expression. 
But also a ‘free’ improvisation, although unrelated to extant scores or recipes, 
still uses musical or gastronomic materials already elaborated and from which it 
draws to make something different. Conversely, those who interpret a piece in 
order to perform it faithfully, without using it for their own ends, are still 
improvising, albeit unintentionally: in fact, they still have to adapt, hic et nunc, a 
cultural construct (a musical work or a recipe) to the concrete and unpredictable 
specificity of the performative situation (cf. Bertinetto 2016a, pp. 92-106). 
Hence, explaining a musical performance and a dish (as a culinary performance) 
in terms of executions of instructions (in a sense similar to that of the running of 
an algorithm) is too simplistic (Haden 2011, pp. 253-4). My point is, then, that 
the key role of the situativity of musical performances and of their transformative 
potential towards the musical work, which (as argued by Bertinetto 2016a) 
makes improvisation paradigmatic for musical ontology (and not, as is often 
believed, a case difficult to explain according to the mainstream ontological 
model), also accentuates the plausibility of the sound and tasty analogy between 
musical works and gastronomic recipes.  
In addition, just as in the musical case in which the performer plays her own 
composition, in the kitchen the ‘composer’ and the ‘performer’ may be 
embodied by the same person: a cook can be the inventor of the dish she herself 
prepares. Moreover, as in the case of musical improvisation, the roles of 
composers and performers can be not only embodied by the same person, but 
carried out at the same time. In home cooking, dishes are often improvised, 
based on the ingredients available, on the cook’s skills, and on the gastronomic 
conventions and traditions that guide her practice. Sometimes this does not 
exclude that the cook achieves excellent results while improvising her dish. Yet 
cooks may also consciously decide to improvise in order to create 
unprecedented dishes.  
The two cases are similar to those of reactive and deliberate improvisation in 
the field of performing arts (cf. Goehr 2016). If during the interpretation of a 
musical work something goes wrong (for example a violin string breaks), the 
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performer is forced to improvise in order to continue the performance, and this 
(reactive) improvisation can also lead to creatively excellent results. Yet, 
improvisation can also be deliberately chosen by musicians as a mode of creative 
performance. Based on available forms, materials, skills and knowledge, 
musicians can produce valuable music by inventing it on the spot. Similarly, 
based on their experience and skills and on the ingredients at their disposal, 
cooks can prepare dishes that realize recipes of which they are not only the first 
instances, but also the inventions. Cooks can improvise on a recipe like jazzmen 
improvise on a standard. Just as jazz players use a melodic and harmonic base as 
a springboard for their inventions on the spot, the chef can, perhaps interacting 
with other cooks, use an existing recipe as a starting point for her creative 
inventions. Yet gastronomic improvisations can also be similar to those typical 
of free jazz or free improvisation, in which one does not improvise on a pre-
existing piece. In this case, cooks invent a new recipe starting from their 
previous knowledge and creatively working with the ingredients and the tools 
available.34 
However, it should be clear at this point that I consider gastronomic (and 
musical) improvisation as having even greater scope. In particular, Preston 
(2013, p. 41) considers it as a significative example of her improvisational model 
of human action. After having presented a version of the recipe of ‘Rolled Pecan 
Cookies’, she writes that «(…) cooking practices do not regard construction as 
unintelligent execution.» Cooks, like musical performers, do not «faithfully 
follow recipes.» Rather,  
 
cooks typically use recipes as a basis for improvisations of various sorts. 
Improvisation is normally a response to local conditions. Sometimes, these are 
difficulties encountered in the construction process. When you do not have an 
ingredient called for by a recipe, you can often substitute something else — 
cocoa and butter can be used in place of baking chocolate, for instance. On the 
other hand, sometimes, local conditions serendipitously make available 
resources you can exploit. A cook with a walnut tree in his backyard might 
substitute walnuts for pecans in the recipe above. A third type of condition 
involves the special needs or desires of the cook and/or her clientele. In the 
cookie recipe above, a vegan cook would substitute a vegetable shortening for 
the butter. Cooks sometimes arrive at a stable customization of a recipe after a 
period of improvisatory experimentation. (…) On the other hand, recipes 
represent a permanent possibility of doing something different on the next 
 
34 I thank an anonymous reviewer for a comment on this point. 
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occasion, perhaps even just on a whim rather than because of some specific 
difficulty or opportunity. A cook might just try rolling these pecan cookies in 
colored sprinkles or shaved chocolate instead of powdered sugar. 
 
Briefly, improvisation enters the kitchen contributing both to the design of the 
recipe and to the realization of the dish, by means of altering — reactively or 
deliberately — the design, rather than following it faithfully. Therefore 
gastronomic improvisation is paradigmatic of human action. 
One may object that cooks sometimes consider improvisation as an 
indication of a lack of preparation and organization, which, far from exhibiting a 
form of creativity, is rather the clear proof of its absence, as Massimo Bottura 
seems to think (Perullo 2011a, p. 231). According to this view, creativity 
involves research and experimentation that allegedly cannot be accomplished 
during the preparation of the dish itself. In short, the authored dish, an original 
creation with aesthetic qualities comparable to those of a contemporary artwork, 
cannot be created on the spot. It is an idea comparable to the prejudice which 
says that musical improvisation offers nothing really creative, because it forces 
performers to repeat monotonously old and chopped stereotypes (cf. Adorno 
1989-90). 
However, the matter can be viewed differently. First, following Preston, it can 
be argued that the design phase, thanks to which a recipe is developed, also 
involves improvisation. Second, and most importantly, it can be argued that the 
idea of the artwork as resulting from the creations of an Author (with a capital 
‘A’) is a prejudice that improvisation contributes to unmasking, while showing 
the shortcomings of the action model based on the distinction between 
intelligent design and faithful mechanical execution. Improvisation foregrounds 
the way in which agents, acquiring, thanks to repeated practice, an expertise, as 
embodied and creative intelligence in a field of activity, draw on a cultural 
background, appropriating and transforming it thanks to a contribution that is 
their own, but is also due to those with which they interact both on the spot and 
in the long run. Improvisers are not undisputed domini of their actions, but 
participate actively-passively in a practice, interacting with other subjects as well 
as with materials, traditions, tools, and cultures that they use and abuse for their 
achievements. Using the resources at their disposal and taking advantage of 
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encounters with others, they generate unforeseeable transformations starting 
from inherited cultural constructs.35 
Improvisation is, then, an exercise in «distributed creativity» (Born 2005). 
It is not just a matter of collaboration between agents, and artists, but between 
different subjects and objects. The improvising musician not only interacts with 
fellow musicians, but with her own musical instrument, with those who produce 
it, with composers and performers of the past, with other artists, with critics, 
with the place where she performs, and with the public which does not passively 
contemplate the performance, but interactively participates. Creativity is not the 
prerogative of the performer alone, but is precisely distributed among various 
subjects, objects, and activities (Cf. Clarke & Doffman 2018). 
This clearly applies to the gastronomic field as well. As suggested by 
Kamozawa & Talbot (2007, p. 277), creative recipes are developed by means of 
improvising on others’ creations. The cook interacts with those who produce the 
ingredients she uses, with waiters and diners (who interact with the cook, 
precisely through the act of eating), past cooks, colleagues and critics, recipes 
books, and various utensils. Improvisation in the kitchen catalyzes all these 
creative contributions.  
In the spirit of Preston’s criticism against the central control model of action, 
this allows us to overcome the rigid distinction between «craftsmanship 
oriented» and «design oriented» gastronomic creativity (Perullo 2011a, pp. 85-
6). Like in music, also in gastronomy, the performance may bring about the 
(more or less successful) rendition of extant recipes and the invention of original 
recipes. And, as seen in Section 2, the same dish may be appreciated and 
understood in both ways: the new interpretation of a traditional recipe and the 
invention of a new recipe. Moreover, a failed instantiation of an extant recipe 
may succeed as invention of a new recipe. In fact, in the context of a creative 
performance, both in cooking as well as in other artistic practices, even mistakes 
may contribute to produce «impromptu creations». Mistakes may be 
«opportunities to discover something new», so that «a failed cake» can be turned 
«into something different and equally delicious» (Kamozawa & Talbot 2007, p. 
278), precisely by means of making sense, i.e. (by trans)forming the normativity 
at stake in the practice (see Bertinetto 2016b). Think about the cocktail Negroni 
 
35  See Hallam & Ingold 2007 for investigations on the improvisational character of human 
culture. 
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Sbagliato: the name itself (‘mistaken Negroni’) reveals the mistake behind its 
invention36. 
Also in the gastronomic field, improvisation brings together, or in any case 
can bring together, habits and tradition with creative experimental research, 
showing that they are complementary attitudes in human practices. Tradition is 
continuously tested, and tasted!, in its application in the concrete circumstances 
of the practices; it is re-invented through the practices that evoke it, the same 
way habits of human behavior are plastic dispositions changing through their 
exercise (cf. Bertinetto & Bertram 2020). Experimentation, even the most 
radical, is based on the traditions from which it produces new inventions. 
As a result, the understanding of the the analogy between musical 
works/performances and recipes/dishes from the perspective of improvisation 
calls into question both «the hierarchies between idea and execution, art and 
craftsmanship, innovation and tradition» (Perullo 2011a, p. 88) as well as the 
hierarchy between musical works and recipes, on the one hand, and 
performances and dishes, on the other hand (Perullo 2011b; Bertinetto 2018). 
The rules of human practices, such as musical pieces and recipes in music and 
gastronomy, are not immutable structures or fixed computational algorithms 
insensible to world’s changes. Rather, they are plans or models that are 
transformed thanks to their applications. And their applications, as in the cases 
of musical performances and dishes, are not just mere executions: more 
precisely, they are performances that impact on the world and its inhabitants, 
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